

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W  
-----061880 261215Z /46  
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FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2534

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 11482

EXDIS

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: DRAFTING GROUP MEETING NO. 230, JULY 25, 1978  
(SALTTWO-1820)

SUMMARY. SOVIETS REVIEWED RESPECTIVE PROPOSALS FOR CRUISE MISSILE DEFINITION. KARPOV COMPARED U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NUCLEAR-ARMED AND NON-NUCLEAR ARMED CRUISE MISSILES WITH MAP CONCEPT, CLAIMING THAT IN BOTH CASES U.S. IS PROPOSING TO DROP BASIC PRINCIPLE OF ARMS LIMITATION. KARPOV IMPLIED SOVIET CM DEFINITION ANALOGOUS TO TYPE RULE FOR LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED MISSILES, WITH CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS COMPARABLE TO LAUNCHERS. U.S. ALSO DISCUSSED ITS "ASSURED INOPERABILITY" PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.

1. KARPOV DISCUSSED AT LENGTH SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE (CM) DEFINITION AND ATTACKED U.S. PROPOSAL ON SAME SUBJECT. AFTER CRITICISING U.S. FAILURE TO PUT DEFINITION IN TREATY, HE REPEATED STANDARD CRITICISMS OF U.S. USE OF TERMS "UNMANNED" AND "WEAPON-DELIVERY," CLAIMING THAT MISSILES ARE BY DEFINITION "UNMANNED," WHICH TERM IS THEREFORE REDUNDANT. HE ALSO REJECTED USE OF TERM "WEAPON-DELIVERY." RE

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U.S.-PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT TO PROTOCOL ARTICLE III, AND INDICATED IT WAS DANGEROUS TO TRY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN NUCLEAR-ARMED AND NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED CMS, AND CLAIMED THAT U.S. PROPOSES THAT AFTER TERM OF PROTOCOL ONLY CARRIERS OF NUCLEAR-ARMED CMS SHOULD BE COUNTED IN 1320 AGGREGATE AND OTHER CMCS NOT COUNTED. U.S. THEREFORE RESERVES RIGHT TO SIDES TO ABOLISH ONE OF THE BASES OF THE

TREATY AFTER PROTOCOL EXPIRES, I.E., 1320 SUBLIMIT FOR CMCS.

2. MCNEILL REBUTTED KARPOV'S ARGUMENTS, NOTING THAT U.S.-PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT DID NOT COMPEL THIS RESULT FOR NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED CMS, BUT DESCRIBED THEM AS AMONG PROPER SUBJECTS OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, ALONG WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF CMS FOR WHICH A TEMPORARY SOLUTION WAS APPROPRIATE. MOREOVER, U.S. POSITION DID NOT AFFECT AGREED TEXT OF ARTICLE V.1. ADDITIONALLY, DUE TO USE OF "UNMANNED" AND "WEAPON-DELIVERY," U.S.-PROPOSED DEFINITION MORE PRECISE THAN SOVIET. FINALLY, U.S. SPOKE OF "VEHICLES," NOT "MISSILES" BECAUSE IMPLICATIONS OF LATTER TERM WITH REGARD TO "UNMANNED" AND "WEAPON-DELIVERY" NOT CLEAR.

3. KARPOV REFERRED TO RECENT U.S. PRESS REPORTS OF U.S.G. CONSIDERATION, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE ICBM SURVIVABILITY, OF NEED TO MAKE AS MANY AS 4,000 "HOLES" AND ROTATE ICBMS. PRESS STORIES ALSO SAID MUCH ABOUT VERIFICATION, BUT NOT HOW IT WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. KARPOV CLAIMED THAT IN THOSE ARTICLES, WHAT WAS ACTUALLY BEING SUGGESTED WAS TO DROP A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THAT IS, LIMITING THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS. IF THIS APPROACH WERE ADOPTED, IT WOULD MEAN "EXPLODING THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT, NULLIFYING IT AND MAKING IT INNOCUOUS." THE SAME THING COULD BE SAID OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO MAKE SECRET

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A DISTINCTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-ARMED CMS AND THOSE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON-ARMED CMS. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW WOULD ONE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THEM AND SAID IT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE BY PAINTING THEM RED OR GREEN AND COUNTING ONLY THE RED IN 1320. SINCE MISSILES WOULD BE STANDARDIZED, EQUIPPING THEM WITH NUCLEAR OR NON-NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD NOT BE SO COMPLICATED.

4. MCNEILL NOTED SIDES HAD ALREADY AGREED PROTOCOL ISSUES WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, AND VERIFICATION QUESTIONS WOULD BE DISCUSSED THEN AS WELL. TURNING TO QUESTION OF "WEAPON-DELIVERY" VERSUS "NON-WEAPON-DELIVERY" VEHICLES, MCNEILL ASKED WHETHER SOVIET USE OF TERM "MISSILE" CARRIED WITH IT IDEA OF "NON-WEAPON-DELIVERY." KARPOV SAID SOME CRUISE MISSILES WOULD BE COVERED BY THE U.S. DEFINITION AND MORE WOULD NOT. IF U.S. BUILT 10,000 TOMAHAWKS, OF WHICH 1,000 WERE WEAPON-DELIVERY VEHICLES AND 9,000 WERE NOT, U.S. WOULD HAVE 9,000 IT COULD EQUIP WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS AT ANY MINUTE.

5. MCNEILL RECALLED THAT WHOLE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSION WAS TO DEFINE CRUISE MISSILES. KARPOV'S REMARKS ASSUMED A

CONCLUSION TO THAT DISCUSSION, THAT A "MISSILE" WAS NOT NECESSARILY A WEAPON-DELIVERY VEHICLE. SUCH AN APPROACH WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOAL OF THE DELEGATIONS' WORK. THE U.S. POSITION IS THAT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS ON CMS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY SIDES IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN THE JOINT STATEMENT THE SIDES WERE ALREADY COMMITTED TO DISCUSS PROTOCOL ISSUES IN THE FUTURE. THIS IS ONE OF THEM. WE HAVE ALSO AGREED TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION AT THAT TIME AND THE U.S. HAD MADE A PROPOSAL FOR BASIC GUIDELINES IN THIS REGARD.

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6. KARPOV REPLIED THAT USSR WAS SKEPTICAL AND CRITICAL OF U.S.-PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT. A CRUISE MISSILE WAS A CRUISE MISSILE; ONCE A CRUISE MISSILE HAD BEEN TESTED, ALL CMS OF THAT TYPE SHOULD COUNT. THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE COUNTING RULES ESTABLISHED FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SHOWN ITS DEVOTION TO THIS CONCEPT BY COUNTING 120 LAUNCHERS AT D&P. THAT WAS EXTREME CASE, WITHOUT A DIRECT BEARING ON THE PRINCIPLE. BUT THERE WAS AN ANALOGY WITH MIRVED OR SINGLE-RV ICBMS. IF TOMAHAWK WAS TESTED AS WEAPON-DELIVERY VEHICLE, IT SUBSEQUENTLY DID NOT MATTER WHETHER IT WAS DEPLOYED WITH A WEAPON OR NOT. IT STILL WOULD BE A CM, AND ANY CMC CARRYING TOMAHAWKS WOULD COUNT.

7. TURNING TO ASSURED INOPERABILITY, MCNEILL RECALLED U.S. HAD MADE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL AT MAY 24 PLENARY REGARDING EARLY DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF EXCESS ARMS WHICH WOULD ENSURE THAT SUCH ARMS WOULD BE RULED OUT FOR COMBAT USE AT AN EARLY DATE. ALTHOUGH THIS IDEA HAD BEEN DRAWN FROM A SOVIET SUGGESTION, THE U.S. HAD STILL NOT HAD RESPONSE FROM SOVIET SIDE. KARPOV SAID SOVIETS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ISSUE.

8. NEXT MEETING FRIDAY, JULY 28, 1978. EARLE

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## Message Attributes

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